Sergey Vasiliev is Professor of International Law at the Open University. Triestino Marinello is Professor of Law at the British Liverpool John Moores University. In addition, he is part of the legal team representing victims from Gaza at the International Criminal Court.
16 November 2026 Lees meer overThe US has placed the International Criminal Court, in its entirety, on its sanctions list. The Netherlands and the EU ‘welcome’ the fact that they have been granted a six-month reprieve to appease Washington. This is self-deception, write Sergey Vasiliev and Triestino Mariniello. Last week it emerged that the Netherlands is negotiating the undermining of the court.

On 9 October 2026, the Trump administration took the extreme step of designating the International Criminal Court (ICC) as a whole under Executive Order 14203. This measure turns the world’s only permanent international criminal justice institution – which, for now, still has 125 member states across every region – into a sanctioned entity, as if it were a criminal organisation or a terrorist group.
Rumours of this unprecedented move by the US had begun circulating ahead of the UNGA High-level Week in September. Those still hoping that Trump would heed States Parties’ calls to keep his ‘hands off’ the Court were bound to be disappointed.
This escalation in the US war on the ICC marks the culmination of an aggressive campaign pursued by the Trump administration since February 2025. The campaign has included the imposition of targeted sanctions on seventeen individuals and entities – nine judges, four senior prosecutors, the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the occupied Palestinian territories, and three Palestinian civil society organisations. It has also involved Secretary of State Rubio’s widely publicised pledge to dismantle the ICC ‘brick by brick’ and intense diplomatic pressure on States to withdraw from the Court and compel it to change course in situations of interest to the US.
Efforts to secure withdrawals have met with some, albeit limited, success. In 2026, four Sahel states (Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Chad), Venezuela, and Naoero initiated the withdrawal process. Unless reversed, these withdrawals will take effect in the second half of 2027. Some of these prospective departures may be attributable to US coercive diplomacy.
Attempts to force the Court to abandon investigations and prosecutions opposed by Washington have yet to achieve their aims. They have, however, intensified the political polarisation surrounding the ICC’s work, putting the Court directly in the line of fire and turning it into a battleground where anything goes.
In 2025, the US demanded that States Parties ensure that the ICC terminate its investigation in Afghanistan, which potentially implicated US armed forces and intelligence services. It also demanded that the ICC drop cases against Israeli suspects and be deprived of the ability to exercise jurisdiction over nationals of non-party states, even for crimes on State Party territory. Rubio has repeatedly, including on this occasion, justified the US campaign as an effort to “neutralize the threat posed by the ICC” to US sovereignty. The ICC poses no such threat: international law permits States to confer jurisdiction on the Court over cases within their territorial jurisdiction.
In contrast to his boss’s off-the-cuff admission during a cabinet meeting on 31 July 2026, Rubio’s statement omitted what is the principal driver of the administration’s extreme hostility towards the Court – its cases against Netanyahu and Gallant and, possibly, other cabinet members, over international crimes in Palestine. Rubio’s silence speaks volumes about the shift in US political discourse on Israel.
Overtly supporting it and seeking to secure impunity for Netanyahu have become too politically costly for the Trump administration ahead of the midterm elections. As opposition to Israel’s genocide in Gaza and criticism of US support for the Israeli government have intensified in the US, openly shielding Netanyahu from the ICC warrant likely carries a major electoral cost for the Republican Party. Yet, Rubio’s telling omission should not obscure the true reason for the US crusade against the Court: “defend[ing] Bibi and various other people”.
With the ICC itself now in the US’ crosshairs, what could its designation as a sanctioned entity mean in practice? Cutting the Court off from suppliers and service-providers could paralyse its investigative and prosecutorial activities across all situations. Unless States Parties adopt the necessary legal and practical measures to protect it from the extraterritorial effects of US sanctions, the designation would degrade its capacity to function, leaving it to die a slow institutional death. Its continued operation as an international organisation, let alone a court of law, would become impossible.
The sanctions block the ICC’s assets and other property interests in the US or in the possession or control of US persons. Subject to exemptions provided for in the general and special licenses issued by the US Department of Treasury, US individuals and companies are prohibited from doing business with the Court. US banks, insurers, IT firms, and other businesses cannot supply the ICC with goods or services or receive payments from it without risking penalties. Many non-US businesses will over-comply and withhold their services out of fear of being sanctioned themselves.
The measures announced on 9 October came with several general licenses authorising specified ICC-related transactions necessary to protect US interests. General License no. 13 provides a 180-day ‘grace period’ (ending on 7 April 2027) for maintaining or winding down the ICC operations. This covers States Parties’ payments to the ICC, salary payments, health insurance, and medical services for its employees or contractors, and payments for rent, utilities, and routine services. Separate licenses permit the provision of certain telecommunication, cloud and software services (General License no. 14), the processing of ICC pension payments (General License no. 15), and services needed for the benefit of specified ICC detainees (General License no. 16).
Presented as an opportunity for States Parties “to demonstrate meaningful progress on diplomatic and legal resolutions” addressing US objections to the Court, the ‘grace period’ provides six months of breathing space. Yet, in essence, it is an instrument of overt political coercion that holds the ICC and its States Parties to ransom. Their readiness to “negotiate and present a solution” acceptable to Washington could determine whether the US grants a further reprieve or eases the sanctions. This carrot-and-stick approach is designed to force States Parties into compliance. It is not a gracious gesture to be welcomed, as the initial reactions of some States Parties and the EU suggest, but an ultimatum.
In response to individual sanctions, States repeatedly expressed ‘regret’, ‘concern’ and ‘disapproval’. A few dared to ‘condemn’ them and fewer still named the culprit. This rhetoric has not been matched by publicly announced measures to safeguard the Court’s ability to function and the integrity of its financial and IT infrastructure.
States Parties have had more than twenty months to prepare for zero hour. Efforts to strengthen the Court’s institutional resilience and digital autonomy should have included coordination with national banks and commercial service providers, the development of alternative payment systems, and access to competitive technologies from non-US suppliers. Some progress has been made on this point: the Court has moved to the German digital platform openDesk to replace Microsoft products. However, more work remains to be done on digital resilience.
Meanwhile, the Court and the French insurer AXA have terminated their contract by mutual agreement against the backdrop of looming US sanctions. Effective practical measures by States Parties and the EU will be crucial to the Court’s survival and ability to function. An effective response from the ICC’s States Parties and the EU will be decisive in securing the Court’s survival and continued operation. The coming weeks will show whether they are ready to deliver.
After the 9 October earthquake, numerous States Parties once again reaffirmed their support for the Court and criticised US sanctions. However, the ICC cannot be defended with statements alone. Performative support rings hollow unless accompanied by a coherent, coordinated strategy for countering US coercion and protecting the ICC’s independence. Declarations will not prevent banks from closing ICC accounts, insurers from withdrawing coverage, tech companies from discontinuing their services, or other businesses from abandoning the Court out of fear of US retaliation.
The EU has repeatedly affirmed that the ICC is a cornerstone of international justice and that its independence from external pressure must be protected. On 10 October, the EU High Representative reiterated this position, calling attacks or threats against the Court, its officials, and those cooperating with it ‘not acceptable’. Beyond these declarations though, the EU has remained passive, seemingly out of fear of further antagonising Trump and triggering US tariffs.
Most notably, the EU has yet to activate its Blocking Statute to prohibit EU operators from complying with US sanctions. Although it is no silver bullet, this measure would go some way towards shielding the ICC. A growing number of Member States and members of the European Parliament have called on the European Commission to extend this legislation to the anti-ICC sanctions and ensure that protections would be in place in the event of Court-wide sanctions. Far from being a ‘nuclear’ option, this step should have been taken earlier. Now that zero hour has arrived, it can no longer be postponed. The six-month reprieve is no excuse for further inaction: the ICC is now living on borrowed time.
It is troubling that some States Parties and the EU have welcomed the humiliating ‘grace period’ as creating ‘scope for dialogue’ and ‘space for diplomacy with Washington. What opportunities for dialogue and diplomacy were unavailable before? What meaningful compromise is possible when the US objective, stated in unequivocal terms, is to destroy the Court? Over the past twenty months, the US has steadily escalated its ‘war on the ICC’ and stopped at nothing to achieve its goal. For States Parties and the EU to expect a different outcome now – and to regard this as an opportunity for a diplomatic resolution – is an exercise in self-deception that betrays, in equal measure, obsequious deference to Washington and a lack of self-respect. Appeasing bullies only emboldens them.
Dialogue under such coercive conditions opens the door to pressure on the ICC to retreat from its mandate in Palestine in exchange for sanctions relief. Accepting US demands, in particular amending the Statute and sacrificing the Palestine investigation to appease the rogue regime in Washington, would destroy the Court as an independent and impartial institution. It would reinforce the perception that international justice operates selectively, depending on the political power of those within its purview. Betraying the ICC’s mandate and victims’ pursuit of justice would mean an intolerable loss of legitimacy for the Court and discredit the very idea that no one is above the law.
Meaningful action is long overdue, but it is not too late. States Parties must now make a principled choice and stick to it. They must defend the ICC and secure its ability to function – not pursue fruitless dialogue with a hostile non-party State, beg it for mercy, and offer concessions neither they nor the Court can afford.
They must publicly commit to increasing the ICC’s budget and provide it with the resources and facilities it needs to withstand political and economic pressure. Whether EU members or not, States must adopt effective legal measures, blocking legislation and safeguards against financial de-risking, to shield the Court, its officials, and those cooperating with it from the extraterritorial effects of US sanctions. These protections must extend equally to Palestinian civil society organisations, targeted for supporting the Court’s investigations.
States must urgently finalise arrangements for alternative banking, payment and digital infrastructure to ensure the Court’s uninterrupted access to essential services. The measures must form a coordinated, structural response, going beyond declarations of solidarity and temporary fixes. If the international community stands by as the US dismantles the ICC, the ability of any international court, including the ICJ – or any national court, for that matter – to operate without fear or favour will become a fiction.
The shortened version of this blogpost was published as a guest opinion by Al Jazeera on 11 October 2026.